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1.  Introduction
The world is changing rapidly, and in ways that seem to be leaving many people behind, with
large fractions of the population in advanced countries seeing their standards of living stagnate,
or even decline, during the past quarter of a century. Fears about the future, and discontent with
economic changes in recent decades—particularly globalization—played an important role in
the U.S. election of 2016 as well as in the Brexit referendum earlier that year. The retort that
globalization is not to blame, but rather technical change, provides little comfort; indeed, even if
the rules of globalization were “fixed,” the worry is that technical change will continue to make
matters worse.
Those looking forward see the possibility—or even likelihood—of a far greater transformation,
as robots equipped with artificial intelligence replace humans. Robots are stronger. They can act
with more precision. They can process more information faster. They can even learn. We do not
know the limits of these robots and our reactions to them, or how fast AI robotization will occur.
The Japanese have invented robots for eldercare—lifting an aged patient and gently giving him
a bath. Presumably, we could program the robot to sing or talk to the patient in a way that was
optimally soothing. The focus of concern, however, is not the virtues of these robots but their
impacts on jobs. There is, for instance, a growing view that in truck driving, driverless vehicles
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will take over, possibly as soon as five years. The worry is that our market economy will not, on
its own, be able to create new jobs with comparable pay for those who are losing their jobs.
How will our society evolve? Will it be a society in which, freed further from the burden of
providing the basic necessities of life, men and women are finally able to do what they want to
do—to reach their full creative potential? And what will happen to those who lack either the
ability or the interest to reach their creative potential? Will they be satisfied playing video games
or whatever forms of “bread and circus” the elites can provide for them?
Over the past 300 years, the world has managed several great transformations, to borrow
the title of Karl Polanyi’s famous book.1 The society and economy of the United States and
other advanced countries, for instance, have moved from being agrarian to manufacturing-based
and from being rural to urban. Obtaining the necessities of survival, which used to consume
all of a family’s efforts, now takes but a few hours a week. Many advanced countries have
transformed from authoritarian regimes to democratic pluralistic societies. Seemingly similar
societies have managed these transformations differently, and almost surely, different societies
will respond to the challenges posed by this next transformation, which may truly be called
“the Great Transformation,” differently.2 How countries respond will, however, have profound
consequences for the nature of society in the twenty-first century. It will affect not only disparities
in well-being (the degree of inequality) but also the magnitude of social tensions—and even the
pace of innovation going forward.
Economists do not have a crystal ball, so they cannot tell whether the pace of innovation will
decrease (as some have suggested3) or not. They cannot tell how fast and to what extent robots and
artificial intelligence will replace humans. They cannot even provide clear links between the ways
in which society responds to robotization and the future pace of innovation. But economic research
in recent years has provided a framework for assessing alternative possibilities and policies—a
rough guide to their likely consequences. We are not totally rudderless. Indeed, I will argue that
the worst nightmares—a world run by and for robots in which humans become the servants of
the machines—are science fiction. We have it in our means to make sure that such a world does
not emerge.
2.  Past  failures
To shed light on how these dramatic changes will play out, and how we can manage them, it
helps to look back at what has happened in the somewhat less dramatic changes that have marked
the last three centuries. Globalization is particularly salient.
2.1.  Broken  promises
The promise was that globalization, together with liberalization, lowering tax rates, and
advances in technology, would make everyone better off, presumably through some form of
trickle-down economics. As the national pie got larger, everyone would get a bigger piece, even
if certain groups’ fractions went down. Even those at the bottom of the income distribution would
be better off. If that had happened, globalization would be greeted enthusiastically by people
in all parts of the world. Instead, one of the main themes uniting civil society around the globe
1 Polanyi (1944).
2 Thus, this paper is inspired by Polanyi’s earlier work. See also Stiglitz (2001).
3 See Gordon (2016). For the alternative view, see Mokyr (2014).
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has been an opposition to globalization. And some of this opposition is understandable. When
I wrote Globalization  and  Its  Discontents  (2002), I argued that the system was stacked against
developing countries. The poorest of the poor were faring particularly badly. Even then, though,
some countries figured out how to manage this seemingly unfair system to their advantage. China
and other countries of East Asia moved hundreds of millions out of poverty and into the middle
class. Branko Milanovic’s data4 show that, apart from the global top 1%, those at the middle of
the global income distribution prospered the most over the past quarter of a century.
Now, globalization’s discontents in the developing world have been joined by the discontents
in the developed world in believing that the system is rigged against them. How can it be that it is
rigged against both workers in developing and developed countries? Simple: it is rigged in favor
of global corporations. It creates a race toward the bottom among workers, with each country
seeking to attract work away from another by offering labor at lower prices. Indeed, standard
economic theory explains why economic integration leads to lower wages of less-skilled workers
in the advanced countries. And if the United States keeps its agricultural subsidies, the poorest
workers—agricultural workers barely living above subsistence—can also see their incomes fall.
Most of the so-called free trade agreements are not really about free trade. They are instead
managed trade agreements—managed for the benefit of corporate interests in the US. Donald
Trump has suggested that America’s negotiators got outsmarted. Anyone who has watched trade
negotiation closely as I have over the past quarter century knows how ridiculous such claims
are. Our negotiators got most of what they wanted—and virtually everything of importance. The
problem is not that they were bad negotiators, but that they wanted the wrong thing. They sought
to fulfill America corporate’s wish list, such as making it difficult for any government to impose
environmental regulations. They were not attempting to ensure that the incomes of America’s
workers would increase, or even that GDP would increase.5
Citizens were told to accept certain changes in the rules of the game because it would make
them better off. Now in many countries workers are told they have to accept cutbacks in wages
and public services in  order  to  compete  in  our  globalized  world.  The disparity between promises
and what has happened has deepened distrust of elites (including in politics and academia) and
democratic politics.
3.  What  economics  teaches  us
Economic science was more honest. It only said that under  certain  conditions  winners could
compensate losers, not that they would—or more formally, that the “utility possibilities curve,”
giving the maximum level of well-being of one individual given the levels of well-being of all
others, was shifted out (Fig. 1). Even this was not true if the assumed perfect market conditions
were not satisfied. For instance, with incomplete risk markets, liberalization of trade and capital
markets could lead to Pareto-inferior equilibria (Newbery & Stiglitz, 1984; Stiglitz, 2008). With
costly redistributions, winners may not be able to compensate losers. With macroeconomic dis-
equilibria (unemployment), jobs in import-competing sectors may be destroyed faster than new
4 Milanovic (2016).
5 The Transpacific Partnership (the TPP) illustrates this. It was heralded as the largest trade deal ever, embracing 44%
of world GDP. After the negotiations were completed, an independent government agency (the United States International
Trade Commission) evaluated the impact on GDP. Their estimate was that, when fully implemented, the increase in GDP
would be .15%—truly negligible. Others thought even this was a gross exaggeration of the benefits. See United States
International Trade Commission (2016).
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Fig. 1. Even with an outward movement of the utility possibilities curve, the competitive allocation (without redistribution)
may leave one group worse off. All that an outward movement of the utilities possibilities schedule means is that all groups
could be made better off, not that the will be made better off.
jobs are created (Stiglitz, 2002)—indeed, there is evidence that a surge of imports from China led
to higher unemployment and lower wages.6 If there are costs of moving from a sector with declin-
ing employment because of productivity increases (as was the case with agriculture a century
ago) to elsewhere in the economy, the economy can easily get trapped in a low-level equilibrium.
In such a situation, what would have been a Pareto improvement if there were zero mobility costs
can, in reality, make everyone worse off (Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, Russo, & Stiglitz,
2012, Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, Russo, & Stiglitz, 2016).
But even if the utility possibilities schedule moves out, the competitive equilibrium may be
such that one group is worse off: more than 100% of the gains go to others. (In Fig. 1, if E1
represents the initial competitive equilibrium, and E2 that after the technological change, one
group is actually worse off.) Globalization represents precisely such a kind of change. Trade
liberalization will lead to a lowering of wages of unskilled labor in the advanced countries, even
though trade liberalization makes the country as a whole better off. (See Samuelson, 1949; Stolper
& Samuelson, 1941.) Economic theory explained that in this situation, both groups could  have
been better off, but only if there are (potentially large) redistributions.7
Unfortunately, in the US and some other advanced countries, the redistributions (adjustment
assistance) required to ensure that all will benefit were not made. There were real losers.8 Not
6 See Autor, Dorn, and Hanson (2013).
7 Formally, if the aggregate production function is Q = F(K, R, Lu, Ls), and there is full employment of skilled and
unskilled workers, a replacement of one unit of convention capital with one unit of robots will reduce the competitive
wage of unskilled workers if F32–F31 < 0, which may well be the case, e.g. if ordinary capital is complementary to unskilled
labor and robots are substitutes.
8 In certain periods, such as after the 2008 crisis, there are large disequilibria in labor markets: even those with training
cannot get jobs. A necessary condition for preventing large costs associated with globalization—and for ensuring that
trade adjustment assistance works—is that the labor market is tight.
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surprisingly, those who lost have not been happy. In the case of technology, they may feel there
is nothing they can do. In the case of globalization, they feel there is: support politicians who
promise to change the rules of the game in ways that protect their interests.
4.  Welfare  economics:  the  critical  norm
The implication of this discussion is that in evaluating changes in policy, there is a critical
norm that we should employ: change is desirable only if it improves social welfare, taking into
account the impacts on distribution. The objective of policy is not to maximize GDP.
Thus, a change in policy that results in losses to the bottom part of the income distribution
would only be desirable if there were very large gains to those at the top—how large would
depend on how inequality-averse  society is.9 Under the Rawlsian criteria, we only need to look
at those at the bottom (that is, society is better off if and only if the worst-off citizens within
the society are better off). Obviously, under the Rawlsian standard, changes and reforms of the
last quarter century may have been welfare-decreasing. But there is a growing consensus that
the distributive consequences of globalization have been large relative to impacts on the size of
the economy, so that in the advanced countries globalization would be welfare-decreasing under
plausible inequality-averse social welfare functions.
Some of those concerned with the potential of robots and other future changes in technology
to lead to high levels of unemployment, in response to these concerns, have come out in favor
of some version of a “universal income benefit,” which would provide all individuals a certain
minimum grant. But recent discussions of well-being have recognized that individuals value
work (see, e.g. Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2010), implying that a system without work, relying
only on redistribution, should not be viewed as acceptable. (Others have responded that our skills
at consuming leisure would improve over time, making such a universal income benefit system
acceptable, so long as the benefit is large enough.)
5.  We  can’t  go  back  in  time
It is, of course, impossible to precisely ascertain the pace and direction of technological change
and its future impacts of globalization. As the song goes, “que sera sera, the future’s not ours
to see.” This much is clear: Manufacturing jobs are not coming back. Global employment in
manufacturing is declining, simply because the pace of productivity growth exceeds the rate of
increase in demand. Because of comparative advantage, the share of the United States (and of
other advanced countries) in these declining manufacturing jobs will also decline. Even if produc-
tion returns, jobs will not: it will be capital-intensive manufacturing. Moreover, protectionism is
unlikely even to help those that it claims to benefit. Standards of living will decrease as a result of
the increased price of imported goods upon which especially those with lower incomes rely. Many
of the imported goods are intermediate goods; for the United States to impose tariffs on these
goods would decrease the country’s competitiveness. Most importantly, the trade deficit is a result
of macroeconomic forces, the disparity between national savings and investment. Protectionism
9 If social welfare takes on a generalized Benthamite form, W = G(U(C)), where G is any monotonic transform of U,
then society is inequality-averse if and only if G′′U + U′′G′ < 0, a sufficient condition for which is that G′′ < 0 and U′′ < 0. Of
course, social welfare functions do not have to take this additive form. For a more general discussion of inequality-averse
social welfare functions, see, e.g. Atkinson (1970), or Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973).
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is unlikely to have much effect on these macro-balances, but by distorting overall efficiency, it
lowers national productivity and thereby standards of living.
There is an important implication of this analysis which I briefly note: The East Asia export-
driven manufacturing development model, which has proven so successful, is not  likely  to  be  the
basis of  development  going  forward. Africa might be able to garner for itself significant numbers
of jobs in manufacturing as China’s wages increase, but this will provide employment for only
a fraction of Africa’s burgeoning population. The question for Africa is, what will replace the
East Asian manufacturing export-led growth model? The risk is that the divergence between
countries—between leaders and followers—could increase.10
6.  Critical  distinctions
We noted earlier that economic research in recent years has provided a framework for assess-
ing the consequences of alternative possibilities. In particular, it has identified some critical
distinctions, which I outline below.
(a) “Equilibrium” impacts—assuming costless adjustment—should be distinguished from dise-
quilibrium impacts, taking account of systemic imperfections and rigidities. In particular, the
economic system may be able to “absorb” small changes; but not large changes. A new set of
problems arises when the pace of innovation is too fast. Often, the advocates of globalization
look past the adjustment period and are describing the future equilibrium state of the world.
The assertion that “globalization is good” then simply means that once we make the transi-
tion we are better off. The desirability of globalization in this case depends on balancing the
present discounted value of the long-run benefits against the present discounted value of the
adjustment costs.
(b) Labor-saving innovations should be distinguished from capital or resource-saving innovations.
The former reduce the demand for labor, lowering wages.11 This discussion notes that different
kinds of innovation can have markedly different effects on the competitive equilibrium, and
in particular, on the distribution of income. For instance, both labor- and capital-augmenting
technological change (given a particular labor supply and capital stock) move out the utilities
possibilities curve, giving the maximum level of utility (well-being) of one group, given that
of others. But if technological change is labor-saving, the competitive equilibrium will be as
depicted in Fig. 1, with workers actually worse off. Capital saving innovation could have the
opposite effect.
(c) Factor bias of technological change should  be endogenous (as should be the capital and labor
supplies) with all these variables being determined simultaneously. With pervasive market
failures, the market-determined bias (and level) of innovation may not be efficient. Indeed,
there is a presumption that it will not be (see chapter 6 of Stiglitz & Greenwald, 2014).
10 Standard theory predicts convergence between laggards and advanced countries, with the speed depending on the
extent to which ideas and capital goods move across borders. But in more sophisticated models, incorporating costs of
learning (and thereby of catching up) there may be an equilibrium in which followers remain a given distance behind
the leaders. Even if they could catch up, this requires resources, and they are better off remaining a follower. See Stiglitz
(2015a).
11 Labor-augmenting technological change (where, as a result of innovation, each worker after the innovation is equivalent
to, say, two workers before) leads to an increase in wages, so long as elasticity of demand for labor is not too low. See
Hicks (1932).
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For instance, the real scarcity in the world today is related to our planetary boundaries: if
we “ruin” this planet through an excessive emission of greenhouse gases, we cannot move
to another. This means that from a social point of view we should be especially focusing on
innovations that reduce emissions; but so far, without a carbon price, firms have little incentive
to do so. At the same time, we see firms devising innovations leading to more unskilled labor
unemployment. Innovators do not confront the cost of unemployment, only the savings to
firms from reducing the usage of unskilled labor. This is important for the broader question
at hand: innovators may have incentives to continue to robotize, even when the social costs
of robots—the high unemployment especially of unskilled workers—is high. There are large
disparities between private and social costs. Of course, this is not inevitable: public policy
can alter incentives. Imposing a cost of carbon emissions will induce firms to look for carbon
saving technologies; and recognizing the social costs of unemployment of unskilled workers
by perhaps imposing a tax on unskilled labor-displacing robots may dampen the pace of
robotization.
Some have criticized such a tax, calling it a Luddite measure. The reality is that when-
ever social and private costs and benefits differ, corrective taxes may lead to more efficient
outcomes. The issue is particularly germane today: the unnaturally low rate of interest in
response to the financial crisis—with governments unnaturally constrained in the use of fiscal
policies—has distorted firms to look for highly capital-intensive innovations, creating condi-
tions for a distorted jobless recovery, requiring very large increases in aggregate demand to
restore the economy toward employment levels normally associated with full employment.
(d) One way that the adverse distributive effects that may arise can be contravened is to tax
the winners to help the losers. Here, the key question is the elasticity of entrepreneurial
effort—will higher tax rates reduce the pace of innovation? There are other ways besides
taxation by which the fruits of innovation can become more widely shared, e.g. through
weakening intellectual property rights, and restricting the abuses of the monopoly power
associated with the granting of a patent. In the latter case, not only will the distribution of
income improve, so will the static efficiency of the economy. Again, the key question is, what
will be the effect on entrepreneurial effort and the overall pace of innovation. (Indeed, in some
cases, weakening intellectual property rights may increase the pace of innovation, because
it results in a larger pool of knowledge upon which others can draw. Though with a given
level of knowledge, stronger intellectual property rights might induce more innovation, if the
impact on the pool of knowledge is considered, the pace of innovation is actually reduced.
See Stiglitz, 2014b; Stiglitz & Greenwald, 2014).
Again evaluations are most easily done from a Rawlsian perspective, but similar results
are obtained with more general inequality-averse social welfare functions. If the benefits
of innovation cannot be translated to the well-being of the worst-off individual, then the
innovation is not welfare-increasing. If the trickle-down effects are small (or negative, as we
have seen in many cases), we should be willing to accept even a slowdown in innovation.
More generally, in all economies, the rules of the game are critical12—similar economies
exhibit markedly different patterns of distribution of market and after-tax and transfer income,
with some of the more innovative economies having more equality. Equality and growth may
12 See Stiglitz, Abernathy, Hersh, Holmberg, and Konczal (2015).
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be complements rather than substitutes.13 This is especially so in an innovation economy:
innovation gives rise to rents—both from IPR and monopoly power. Who receives those rents,
and the extent to which the government “recaptures” these rents through taxation, is a matter
of policy.
(e) Political economy is crucial—one needs to pay attention not only to what is feasible  but also to
what is likely to happen, given how the political system works. Moreover, political systems are
evolving. Policies, e.g. relating both to innovation and the political process itself, may affect
how they evolve. For instance, in the United States, money matters a great deal in politics.
Economic rules that allow, say, corporations to appropriate some part of the knowledge which
might otherwise be in the public domain result in their having more money with which to
influence the economic and political rules in ways that favor their lot.
7.  Conditions  under  which  evolution  of  technology  is  likely  to  be  welfare-increasing
This broad framework allows us to ascertain conditions under which the evolution of the
economy—even robotization—is likely to be welfare-enhancing. We begin with the hypothesis
already enunciated—the economy will be moving away from manufacturing (at least as measured
by employment) and evolving toward a service-sector economy. Indeed, it has already moved a
considerable distance in that direction.
7.1.  Recognizing  the  value  of  key  public  services
Among the key service sectors are education, health, and other public services. The essential
assumption in our analysis is that the value of those services is largely socially determined—not
“just” a market process. If we value those services highly—pay good wages, provide good working
conditions, and create sufficient number of jobs—that will limit the growth in market income
inequality. The value of these services depends on how we, as a society, care about our children,
our sick, and our elderly. If we believe our children should be well looked-after and well educated,
we will want those who do that to be “high quality,” not those who cannot get jobs elsewhere.
We might understand that many who work in this sector do so because they are dedicated and
love children. Still, if there is an enormous disparity between the wages of teachers and bankers,
banking will become more attractive. Thus, if we pay our teachers more, we will get more bright,
hardworking individuals to take care of our children, and they will exert greater effort in their
jobs. So too, if we want those who care for our elderly to be more compassionate, more engaged,
then we will need to pay higher salaries.
Of course, in a very divided society, where the rich pay for these services themselves, living in
effect in their own rich ghettos, they can value their children and their parents highly—and hire
the people to provide the high-quality care they want. They may actually prefer lower wages in the
public sector, because that makes it easier for them to hire the more talented. It is not just that in a
society in which the 1% is running the economy for themselves they ignore  the public provision,
which the rich have little interaction with anyway. It is also that lower wages in the public sector
benefit the wealthy twice: low wages entail lower taxes, and the lower wages in the public sector
13 There is by now a long line of research arguing this. See Stiglitz (2012, 2015b, 2015c), Makowski and Ostroy (1995).
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depress private-sector wages for those services, allowing the wealthy to procure them for their
children and parents at lower cost.
This is a shortsighted view: poorly educated children of the general population result in a poorly
functioning economy and may make the political system prey to demagogues. But the financial
sector and corporate sectors are notorious for their shortsightedness, and we should expect that
shortsightedness to extend to views about the provision of public services. Those sectors focus
on the costs—the increased taxes that they might have to pay—and not on the benefit to the entire
society, of which they are a part.
Higher pay will result in such jobs having higher “respect,” and this will be true even for jobs
with limited skill requirements. Moreover, the benefits of paying higher wages will extend beyond
the public sector: private-sector wages will follow public-sector wages.
7.2.  Broader  measures  may  be  required
These measures may not suffice, i.e. it may still be the case that market wages for low-skilled
workers may be so low that even a full-time worker will not achieve a livable income. Thus, it
may be necessary to enact a higher minimum wage and provide a wage subsidy for low-wage jobs
(e.g. an earned income refundable tax credit), to encourage demand for such jobs and increase
wages. (Later in this paper we will describe other measures that might be undertaken.)
If the elasticity of entrepreneurial services is low, we can impose high taxes to finance these
valuable service-sector jobs and the earned income tax credit. There are many other ways of raising
the requisite tax revenues—pollution taxes (carbon taxes) improve the environment as they raise
revenue; land and natural resource taxes and other taxes on rents (on inelastically supplied factors)
raise revenues without giving rise to distortions. Taxes on rents may actually reduce the incentives
to engage in rent-seeking activities, thereby improving the efficiency of the economy.
7.3.  Endogenous  responses  in  patterns  of  technological  change
If the endogenously determined bias of technological change works as it should (Stiglitz,
2014a), as wages get low, innovation should focus on capital- and resource-augmenting technical
change. This will limit the decline in the share of labor (in stable equilibrium) and in inequality.14
Under the conditions described in this section, the benefits of growth—even robot-induced
growth—can be shared equitably, and in ways that ensure full employment. There is a larger
pie—so everyone can be better off.
8.  Alternative  approaches  to  shared  prosperity
There are a couple of other ways to ensure a modicum of shared prosperity in the face of, say,
increasing robotization.
Almost surely, there will be some “real” labor required. A first requisite for shared prosperity
is that the demand for those real labor services is equitably shared.
14 If the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity, the steady state equilibrium may be unstable. A slight perturbation
leading to a larger share of capital induces more capital-augmenting technological change, leading to a larger share
of capital, leading to further increases in capital-augmenting technological progress. See Stiglitz (2014a), including a
formalization of these dynamics, as well as a discussion of the limitations in the underlying assumptions.
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8.1.  The  limiting  case  of  laborless  production
Consider, in the alternative, the limiting case where no labor is required. The only two factors
of production are “knowledge” and “capital.” Currently, patented knowledge that has been pro-
duced more than 20 years earlier belongs within the public domain. Assume that the patent were
to be extended, but that all the proceeds of the patent were used to finance the services described
in the previous section, an earned income tax credit (or similar wage subsidy), and a universal
income benefit. The only differential  return to knowledge that would go to the “innovative class”
is that associated with new  knowledge. Typically, on average, across all the sectors of the econ-
omy, productivity increases slowly, implying that the knowledge rents associated with this “new
knowledge” would be limited.
The seemingly higher rents we see associated with innovation arise from the ability to extend
in time knowledge rents and/or to use the short-term knowledge monopoly to create a more self-
sustaining monopoly, e.g. associated with network externalities. The proposal of the previous
paragraph represents an attempt to limit the extent of “evergreening,” of extending in time the
rents associated with a patent. But that likely will not suffice. There will need to be a high tax on
monopoly rents, complemented with more effective anti-trust actions.
In short, earlier we argued that we must evaluate the desirability of any change (policy or
technology) with an equalitarian social welfare function. This means that any innovation which
results in significant decreases in living standards of those at the bottom should be rejected. And
that means that we should be willing to accept heavy taxes on those benefiting from innovation
(including on the innovators) or other actions, such as that described here, moving knowledge
more forcefully into the public domain.
The argument that such actions will slow down the pace of innovation is unpersuasive for
two reasons. First, it may not do so: having more shared prosperity—more people, for instance,
with access to high quality education—may increase the pace of innovation. Secondly, and more
importantly, innovation is not an end in itself, it is a means to an end. Innovations may be welfare-
decreasing, unless accompanied by policies that ensure that the fruits are equitably shared.15
9.  Inequitable  growth
While the previous two sections argued that even with extreme robotization, shared prosperity
is economically feasible, the economy may not go in that direction. Politics matters. There is a
possibility of the economy sinking into a low-level equilibrium trap, into endemic high levels of
inequality. The rich take a strong stance against the redistributions that are necessary to achieve
shared prosperity. In a politics in which money matters, if there is enough money at the top, and
enough political conviction against progressive taxation, then innovations and policy reforms like
globalization will lead those at the bottom, including unskilled workers, to be worse off. This in
turn means that episodically, politicians may arise to exploit this unrest, and the reforms will be
undone, public support for basic research (the wellspring from which most innovation arises) will
be reduced, and other populist measures will be undertaken. Even before such extreme events,
there may be a direct cost to society for this political uncertainty—investment is discouraged, and
especially the long-run investment associated with innovation. Other supply-side effects weaken
15 In making these welfare assessments, we may want to include an explicit valuation associated with “dynamism.” The
process of learning associated with being in an innovative economy may have value in its own right.
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innovation: inequitable access to education means that the society is drawing on a smaller talent
pool.
One might ask, surely, seeing this risk, why those at the top would not see it as being in their
own interests (their own enlightened  self-interest) to support policies ensuring shared prosperity?
The answer is that that may happen: it has occurred in the Nordic countries. (See Stiglitz, 2015a
and the references cited there.) But while it may be in the interests of society as a whole, it may
not be in the interests of any particular well-off individual. Moreover, for reasons already briefly
noted, behavior in the realm of politics may be even more shortsighted than in the realm of finance.
10.  Transition
So far, we have focused our attention mostly on the long-run equilibrium. But even were it
possible to manage the long-run equilibrium in ways that ensure shared prosperity, the transition
may not be easy, and especially, it may not be easy for the same groups that will lose out in
the long run. Large changes (globalization and robotization are both potentially large changes)
require a structural transformation of the economy, and markets on their own are not good at
structural transformation. The reasons for this are easy to understand. Individuals have to move
from one sector to another, requiring “new” human capital. They often have to move from one
place to another. All of this requires money—just at a moment when the assets of those in the
“old” sectors have declined dramatically. For instance, the value of both their home and their
human capital may well have decreased.
The Great Depression can be viewed as being caused by the rapid pace of innovation in
agriculture. Fewer workers were needed, resulting in marked decline in agriculture income, leading
to decline in demand for urban products. The latter effect was so large that long-standing migration
patterns were reversed, and there was a net migration to rural areas in 1931–4, even as the
agricultural sector continued to decline (see Delli Gatti et al., 2012). What might  have been a
Pareto improvement turned out to be technological change that caused misery, as both those in
the urban and rural sector suffered.
There is a general result: with mobility frictions and rigidities technological change can be
welfare-decreasing (Delli Gatti et al., 2012, 2016).
Government intervention in the transition enabled the successful structural transformation—an
unintended byproduct of World War II. War spending was not only a Keynesian stimulus, but
also facilitated the move from rural to urban, from agricultural to manufacturing, including the
retraining of the labor force, especially with the G.I. Bill. It was, in effect, a very successful
industrial policy.
There are clear parallels to the situation today, where the economy may be caught in a low-level
equilibrium trap. Again, the decline in incomes of those in the “old” sectors has led to a decrease
in aggregate demand, greater than the increase in aggregate demand from the growth sectors. The
result is that, in the transition, there may be persistent deficiencies in global aggregate demand.
But this sets off a vicious circle: weak aggregate demand weakens wages, increasing inequality,
and weakening aggregate demand further.16
Government needs to pursue not just a Keynesian stimulus, but Keynesian structural
policies—spending that helps restructure the economy.
16 This is sometimes referred to as secular stagnation. But it is important to realize that this state of affairs is not an
incurable disease; it is simply the consequence of the failure of government to respond as it should to the underlying
forces requiring a structural transformation.
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But the Great Transformation that we may be confronting requires more than just an economic
transformation, in which resources are moved from one use to another. A social  transformation
as well as an economic transformation may be necessary, affecting, for instance, what kinds of
jobs are viewed as “acceptable” by various groups in society. Such a social transformation would
be more easily navigated if more service-sector jobs paid decent wages.
Globally, the money required to finance the economic transformation could come from the
creation of a global reserve system,17 or even new issuances of special drawing rights under
current arrangements, carbon taxes, and rent taxes.
There is a long list of policies to facilitate a welfare-increasing transition and ensure a welfare
enhancing long-run equilibrium. These include:
(a) Policies to increase wages of even low-skilled jobs. Among the policies, perhaps the most
important is maintaining a high level of aggregate demand—to ensure a low unemployment
rate and to increase workers’ bargaining power.
(b) Wage subsidies for low-wage jobs (as described earlier), and a vastly expanded Earned income
tax credit—to ensure that no one who works full time is in poverty.
(c) Minimum wage, which also would (together with other measures) help encourage innovations
that increase productivity of labor at the bottom (in the standard theory of endogenous factor-
biased technological change).
(d) High wages in the public sector—to help drive up wages in economy more generally. There
may be other policies to encourage attractiveness of such jobs and increase respect for them.
(e) A high carbon tax—to encourage resource saving innovation, at the expense of labor sav-
ing innovation. Such a tax would simultaneously address two of the most serious global
problems—it would discourage carbon emissions and it would increase aggregate demand,
as firms retrofitted themselves in response to the high carbon price. Moreover, the revenues
from the tax would be useful in carrying out the other measures described above.
(f) Elimination of tax deductions for interest, and the imposition of a tax on capital—to induce
more capital-augmenting innovation.
(g) A “wage share” tax to encourage firms to increase the share of their revenues they pay out to
workers (for instance, increasing the profit tax rate if the wage share, appropriately defined,
is decreased).
(h) Narrowing the breadth and duration of patents, and circumscribing use of patents to create
monopolies.
(i) More reliance on public research, with government appropriating returns, and directing
research toward resource-saving innovation and away from labor-using innovation.
(j) More effective antitrust laws, more effectively enforced.
(k) An increase in labor-demand-increasing public investments (i.e. public investments that are
complementary with labor, and especially unskilled labor).
(l) Changes in labor laws to increase workers’ bargaining power—labor markets are typically
imperfectly competitive, with wage outcomes affected by the relative bargaining power of the
two sides. Changes in labor legislation in the last third of a century have weakened workers’
bargaining powers.
(m) Tax and education policies to weaken the intergenerational transmission of advantage and
disadvantage.
17 See, for instance, United Nations (2010) and Greenwald and Stiglitz (2010a, 2010b).
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(n) Education and training policies helping individuals cope with the changes.
(o) Place-based policies—it is not always feasible, efficient, or equitable to ask individuals to
move to where the jobs are, rather than to move jobs to where the people are. Market-based
processes of location are, on their own, not necessarily efficient.
Most of these policies have been tried and have worked. All of this is economically feasible.
The question is whether it is feasible within our political systems.
11.  Concluding  comments
A central message of this paper is that both in the transition and in the long run, there is no reason
to be confident that markets will automatically adjust in ways that maintain full employment, and
even when employment is high, large fractions may be in very low-wage jobs without much
intrinsic or extrinsic job satisfaction. Robotization and other large potentially  welfare-increasing
changes may actually lead to lower societal well-being in the absence of appropriate government
policies. The great divide in our society will become even larger.
The fact that in earlier transitions eventually  the economy reached full employment and those
at the bottom did well is no assurance that it will happen this time. This  time  could  be  different.
But even in these earlier episodes, government intervention was required to prevent excessive
immiseration. Some form of “universal basic income” may be necessary as a fallback. But I have
suggested that it would be better to create meaningful work with decent pay for as many people
as possible, and I have explained how this can be done.
The failure to achieve this shared prosperity may, in the end, be shortsighted: policy reforms
that hold out the promise of increased growth from globalization, or even those that focus on
innovation itself, may not be sustainable in the absence of a modicum of shared prosperity.
We may be at the edge of another Great Transformation. There are alternative paths forward.
I have described one—which puts the economy on a path toward shared prosperity. But there
are others—with ever increasing concentration of economic wealth and economic and political
power. The great debate today concerns which path to follow.
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